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We examine the strength and nature of firm aspiration and expectation as strategic mediators in the 
association of risk antecedents and firm risk, after exploring the possible impact of such antecedents on firm 
aspiration, and firm aspiration’s preliminary influence on firm risk. Empirical literature is mostly silent about risk 
antecedents of firms in an emerging market or cross-country context, and to the best of our knowledge, the 
mediators proposed in this study are yet to be explored. We report strong significant positive mediating effects 
of firm aspiration and expectation in association of risk antecedents and firm risk. Our results also validate that 
all studied risk antecedents, except corporate governance- composition, significantly influence aspiration and 
expectation mediators and firm risk in line with our hypotheses. Our results also hold true after controlling for 
firm-level and country-level heterogeneities and conducting two additional robustness tests.   
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Firm risk is one of the key issues taken into consideration in managerial decision-making, and therefore 
features prominently in strategic management research (Ruefli et al., 1999; Klingebiel, 2018). Empirical 
researchers have studied the determinants and consequences of firm risk (see e.g., John et al., 2008; 
Li et al., 2013; etc.) and the industrial and organizational contexts that affect managerial risk-taking 
behaviour (see e.g., Bromiley, 1991; Palmer and Wiseman, 1999; Das and Teng, 2001; etc.). However, 
most of these studies focus on the US and other developed markets worldwide, and little attention is 
paid to these issues in the emerging market or cross-country context. Also, empirical research is mostly 
silent about why a firm undertakes or bears more or less risk, with the exception of studies where 
variable risk preferences influenced by performance relative to a firm’s aspiration are assumed (see 
Bowman, 1980; Bromiley, 1991; Greve, 2003). If firm performance is adjudged as below the level of 
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1 Firms are risk-averse when their performance is above (better than) the strategic reference point and risk-taking when 
performance is below (worse than) the strategic reference point (Fiegenbaum et al., 1996). Managers determine reference 
points through considerations of internal capability, external conditions, and time. Internal capabilities include both strategic 
inputs (organizational capabilities, functions, value-added activities) and strategic outputs (results of the firm’s operations). 
External conditions include competitors’, customers’, and stakeholders’ influences. The time dimension includes both the 
past (organizational learning and identity) and the future (strategic intent). 
2 Ansoff describes five levels of strategic thrust: stable, reactive, anticipating, exploring, and creative. In practice, the choice 
between the five levels is based on the aspiration-performance gap, external environment, internal capabilities, culture, and 
leadership, among other criteria (Ansoff, 1979: 113). 
3 They are “the organization’s past goal, the organization’s past performance, and the past performance of other 
‘comparable’ organizations” (Cyert and March, 1963: 115). 
 
4 
March, 1963).1 Deciding what specific action is to be taken involves a choice of strategic thrust2 (Ansoff, 
1979: 65). However, Chen and Miller (2007) contradict this notion, stating that high levels of 
performance could lead to higher risk-taking and change. Thus, researchers use firm aspirations to 
explain the risky choices of firms (Bromiley, 1991; Greve, 2003; Ref and Shapira, 2017; Gao et al., 2019). 
The antecedents and consequences of firms’ aspirations have also been studied in detail. The 
empirical evidence concerning antecedents of firm aspiration has been expanded (see Short and 
Palmer, 2003; Panagiotou, 2007; Iyer and Miller, 2008) beyond the three factors3 identified by 
behavioural theory. Further studies document the critical influence of internal factors (e.g., size and 
age of the firm (Short and Palmer, 2003); slack (Audia and Greve, 2006); leadership (Baum and Locke, 
2004; Guney et al., 2018; Guo et al., 2019); and external factors (see Gooding et al., 1996) on firm 
aspiration. Past studies also document individual organisational and industrial drivers of firm risk in 
relation to firm fundamentals (see Jensen et al., 1992; La Porta et al., 2000; Autio, 2005; Delmar and 
Wiklund, 2008; Lu et al., 2019); firm performance (see Fisher and Hall; 1969; Bowman, 1980; Greve, 
1998; Massini et al., 2005; DasGupta and Deb, 2020); and corporate governance (see Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Brick and Chidambaran, 2008; Cheng, 2008; Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008; Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009; Pathan, 2009; Bhagat et al., 2015; Hutchinson et al., 2015). However, all these divergent 
results from past empirical studies appear to be conditional on industry, economic condition, time 
period, or selection of the social comparison group. Amidst these, it is imperative to identify the actual 
driver of firms’ aspiration in our cross-country contexts before examining its role as a strategic 
mediator. 
In addition, while it is widely accepted that a firm’s aspiration influences strategic behaviour, the 
moderators of the aspiration-consequence relationship and firm aspiration as a mediator in strategic 
decisions related to firm risk are understudied (Short and Palmer, 2003; Vissa et al., 2010; Kuusela et 
al., 2017). Empirical research is also silent about the possible critical effect of firms’ corporate 
governance structure and mechanisms on firm aspiration level. Therefore, here, we attempt to identify 
the drivers of firm risk in a cross-country context with firm data for four emerging (BRICS (except 
Russia)) and four developed economies after controlling for country- and firm-level heterogeneities. 
Our main objective is to examine the strength and nature of the mediating effect of firm aspiration on 
the association between risk antecedents and firm risk after examining the possible impact of such 
antecedents on firm aspiration, and firm aspiration’s preliminary influence on firm risk. To make our 
study more in-depth, we also cross-validate our proposed model and empirical results with firm 
expectation as the mediator and perform further robustness tests. 
The strategic management literature (see Cyert and March, 1963; Ansoff, 1979; Fiegenbaum et al., 
1996) documents that the strategic behaviour of firms is guided by the discrepancy between firm 
aspiration and performance. There are three distinct analytical frameworks i.e., the behavioural theory 
(Cyert and March, 1963); Ansoff’s strategic management view (Ansoff, 1979; 1987); and the strategic 
reference  point  theory  (Fiegenbaum et al., 1996)  to  explain  firm  aspirations.  Behavioural  theorists 
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4 Despite the fundamental differences between the three views, they have important similarities. All agree that performance 
is influenced by strategic behaviour, and that firm aspiration is a critical factor in determining such strategic behaviour. In 




argue that firms adjust their aspirations based on past experience (Cyert and March, 1963). 
Accordingly, we measure firm’s current aspiration level in relative terms to its preceding year’s own 
historical performance on a rolling basis. In contrast, both Ansoff’s (1979) strategic management view 
and the strategic reference point theory of Fiegenbaum et al. (1996) assume that firms are forward-
looking and prioritise expected performance.4 Accordingly, we measure firm’s expectation level by 
future Price-to-Earnings (PE) ratios (which represent both internal firm fundamentals and external 
market sentiment) in relative terms to its own PE from the preceding year on a rolling basis. Therefore, 
we examine the direct (on firm risk) and mediating (between risk antecedents and firm risk) impact of 
both firm aspiration (based on firm’s historical performance) and firm expectation (based on firm’s 
P/E multiples).  
On an overall basis, we contribute to the existing strategy and finance literature in three ways. First, 
we empirically validate our main research issue that firm aspiration as well as expectation strongly act 
as strategic mediators between firm risk and its constructed antecedents. We report that the impact 
of risk antecedents on firm risk is positively strengthened in the presence of both firm aspiration and 
expectation mediators. To the best of our knowledge, this has not been reported earlier. These results 
also hold true after controlling for both firm- and country-level heterogeneities. Second, we formulate 
four independent constructs of firm fundamentals, firm performance, corporate governance-board 
composition, and board effectiveness, and find that all of them influence both firm aspiration and 
expectation significantly. However, although firm fundamentals, corporate governance-board 
composition, and board effectiveness also have a significant impact on firm risk, firm performance has 
no role to play in driving such behaviour. We also believe that our constructs—as developed—and 
supporting evidence of antecedents of firm risk in a cross-country and cross-cultural set-up contribute 
to the otherwise scant literature in this area. Third, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first 
in the strategic management literature in this context to use the structural equation modelling (SEM) 
approach. SEM is a second-generation multivariate method that is used to assess the reliability and 
validity of the model measures by confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), and is therefore far superior to 
other regression methods.  
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 talks about the relevant literature 
and developed hypotheses, section 3 presents data and methodology, section 4 presents the results, 
and section 5 concludes our paper with the relevant discussion, followed by references, tables, and 
figures. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
FIRM FUNDAMENTALS AND FIRM RISK 
 
The theoretical arguments on whether strong fundamentals (we incorporate market size (net sales), 
growth opportunities (% change in total assets), dividend pay-out ratio (dividend pay-out as a % of PAT) 
and Price/Book value [P/BV]) have a positive or negative impact on the aspiration level (used as a 
mediator here) and, therefore, firm risk are conflicting. On the one hand, according to the ‘bird in the 
hand’ dividend theory (Bhattacharya, 1979), investors prefer dividends to retained earnings; therefore, 
firms would set a large dividend pay-out to maximise their share price, which would impact P/BV 
positively. However, the ‘tax preference theory’ (Brennan, 1970; and Elton and Gruber, 1970) proposes 




that investors prefer the retention of a firm’s profit over the distribution of cash dividends, which 
would therefore provide the wrong signal (Aharony and Swary, 1980 (‘signalling theory’ of dividend)) 
about firm performance to the market participants, and would have a negative impact on the P/BV 
ratio through declining stock prices. Venkatesh (1989) also argues that higher level of firm risk might 
cause a reduction in a firm’s willingness to discharge cash through dividend payments. Therefore, in 
choosing dividend pay-out levels, managers strategize in order to sustain future earnings with a high 
degree of certainty. This suggests that dividend payments would be inversely related to firm risk. 
Further, Jensen (1986) demonstrates that as the free cash flow increases, it raises the agency 
conflict between the interests of managerial and outside shareholders, leading to a decrease in the 
performance of the company. Increase in free cash flow could only take place when the past 
performance was higher and dividend pay-outs were lower. In such a case, we can presume that the 
firm has a large market size with increased sales, and that its P/BV would also be high given that market 
participants prefer stocks with strong performance (see e.g., Jensen et al., 1992; Lu et al., 2019). 
However, such an increase in free cash flow would cause a performance-aspiration gap (i.e., 
attainment discrepancy) and, when performance declines to below the aspiration level for such firms 
in the future, it would induce risk-taking. Furthermore, in such situations, firm managers may indulge 
in wasteful practices or value-destroying activities (La Porta et al., 2000; Chari et al., 2019).  
A high or low dividend pay-out ratio would also be considered in conjunction with the growth 
opportunities available to the firm. A review of the literature (see Jensen et al., 1992; La Porta et al., 
2000; Autio, 2005; Delmar and Wiklund, 2008; etc.) reveals several explanations for the relationship 
between growth opportunities and dividend policy. One of these explanations is that a firm tends to 
use internal funding sources to finance investment projects if it has large growth opportunities and 
large investment projects. Such a firm chooses to cut the rate or pay fewer dividends to reduce its 
dependence on costly external financing. In contrast, firms with slow growth and fewer investment 
opportunities pay higher dividends to prevent managers from over-investing the firm’s cash and 
indulging in value-destroying activities (La Porta et al., 2000; Chari et al., 2019). Several studies have 
also used sales/revenue growth as a proxy for a firm’s growth and opportunities (see Jensen et al., 
1992; Travlos et al., 2002; etc.). Thus, high growth opportunities prompt firms to pay smaller dividends 
and encourage such firms to aspire to higher performance when their performance is below the 
aspiration level. Accordingly, high growth opportunities would have a positive impact on firm risk for 
firms below aspiration levels, and the reverse is true for firms with a positive performance-aspiration 
gap.   
Overall, it is evident that strong fundamentals imply a low aspiration level and thereby lower risk-
taking by firm managers. However, when firm aspiration level is high, especially in case of attainment 
discrepancy (March and Shapira, 1987), firms might be induced to engage in higher risk-taking. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 
H1a: Strong firm fundamentals have a negative impact on aspiration level of the firm. 
H3a & H3b: Strong firm fundamentals have a negative impact on firm risk. 
 
FIRM PERFORMANCE AND FIRM RISK 
 
The impact of firm performance on its aspiration level and subsequent or independent risk-taking has 
been studied in detail, especially in the strategic management literature. Firm performance relative to 
firm  aspiration  influences  the  level  of  search  and, therefore, organisational change  (see behavioural  




theory, Cyert and March, 1963); level of firm risk-taking (see strategic reference point theory, 
Fiegenbaum et al., 1996); and the decision to choose a strategic thrust (Ansoff, 1979). 
The behavioural theory (Cyert and March, 1963: 115) argues that firms are expected to establish an 
aspiration based on ‘a weighted function of’ the past goal, own past performance, and past 
performance of others (peers) (see also Greve, 1998; and Massini et al., 2005; Guney et al., 2018; Guo 
et al., 2019). It is theorized that failing to achieve such an aspiration level would prompt firms to initiate 
problematic search, resulting in organizational changes. In addition, firms with higher present 
performance strive for a higher aspiration level in the future because this level is dependent on the 
performance of self (historical) or peers (social): this makes them high risk-taking in regard to 
innovative search behaviours (Bromiley et al., 2001; Gao et al., 2019). Strategic reference point theory 
(Fiegenbaum et al., 1996) argues that firm managers frame issues (such as risk-taking) as threats when 
above their reference point and as opportunities when below their reference point. Managers 
determine reference points through considerations of internal capability, external conditions, and 
time: accordingly, reference points are variable. Firms that continuously adapt their aspirations to 
changes in internal and external conditions and exhibit higher consensus on those reference points 
are predicted to achieve high performance through such risk-taking. Ansoff (1979) also observes that 
managers adapt aspirations in response to changes in internal or external factors such as 
environmental conditions and future performance expectations. Ansoff (1984) later extends his earlier 
framework to include the responsiveness of the firm’s capability (i.e., ability to adapt). According to 
Ansoff, a firm’s strategic thrust (such as risk-taking) matches environmental turbulence, internal 
capabilities (slack generated through superior performance), and capability components design to 
support both (Moussetis, 2011; Lu et al., 2019). Overall, these views imply that higher aspiration 
attainment discrepancy motivates expending efforts to reduce such discrepancy through strategic 
actions, resulting in change or risk-taking. 
The empirical literature has also viewed firm performance and firm risk from a practical viewpoint. 
Fisher and Hall (1969: 82) were the first to present an economic argument of firm performance’s 
impact on its risk — “this implies that earnings should be larger, on the average, for firms with greater 
variation in their earnings than for firms with little earnings variability”. The direct impact of firm 
performance on firm risk is central to the works of Bowman (1980; 1984), Singh (1986), and DasGupta 
and Deb’s (2020) research. However, most of these empirical studies view the impact of such 
performance on firm risk from a troubled-firm context and not on an overall top-down basis. In 
addition, income stream uncertainty has mostly been studied by either considering the return on 
assets (ROA) or return on equity (ROE) measures. Therefore, to fill these research gaps in the existing 
literature, we consider actual firm performance, actual market-return performance of a firm, and also 
its cash performance when examining the impact of firm performance as a whole on firm risk. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 
H1b: Strong firm performance has a positive impact on aspiration level of the firm. 
H4a & H4b: Strong firm performance has a positive impact on firm risk. 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM RISK 
 
Standard theory on corporate governance predicts that firms with better governance increase firm 
value by adopting projects with positive net present value (NPV). However, this theory does not 
preclude the possibility of the firm investing in projects with risky cash flows (Chari et al., 2019). 
Therefore, it might be in the interest of shareholders to take on risky projects as long as they are value- 




enhancing. In addition, option theory (Black and Scholes, 1973; and Merton, 1974) suggests that, all 
else being equal, the value of an option increases with the volatility of the underlying asset. Based on 
these arguments, we might expect a positive association between effective corporate governance 
and firm risk. 
Pathan (2009) observes that a firm’s board effectiveness in terms of monitoring its managers and 
limiting their opportunistic behaviour depends upon its characteristics (such as board size and 
composition). Because there is limited theoretical evidence as to the most important board 
characteristics, we make an ad-hoc selection of variables here based on those emphasized most in the 
empirical literature as a proxy for a ‘strong board’ and an ‘effective board’, namely, independent 
directors and women directors for strong board, and board size and number of meetings for effective 
functioning. Our proxies of such strong and effective boards are more independent directors and 
higher presence of women directors, and small board size and higher frequency of board meetings, 
respectively. 
 
BOARD COMPOSITION AND FIRM RISK 
 
Board composition or diversity (proxied by percentage of independent and women directors) is 
important for effectiveness of the firm’s board. Such diversity also results in better firm performance 
as well as quality of earnings and/or lower risk-taking propensity by managers (see Fama and Jensen, 
1983; and Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008). Independent directors’ presence in large relative 
numbers on a firm board is expected to contribute to better monitoring given that such directors are 
independent of management and place importance on protecting their own reputation in the labour 
market (Fama, 1980; Chari et al., 2019). Therefore, under the reputation hypothesis, independent 
directors would support investment in less risky projects, which would help firms avoid losses and 
therefore protect their image (Pathan, 2009). This also speaks about the lower level of aspiration in 
comparison with that of their social peers. Furthermore, because of the strict monitoring of 
managerial activities, such firms would maintain at least the status quo in terms of performance, and 
would never fall below their aspiration level. In addition, in accordance with the monitoring hypothesis, 
we assume that the presence of independent directors on firm boards reduces firm risk. This 
hypothesis assumes that as a result of limited information available to a firm’s executives, information 
asymmetry increases, and, consequently, the cost of information becomes higher for non-executive 
directors (Boone et al., 2007; Raheja, 2005). There is also empirical evidence that supports the above 
arguments, suggesting a negative relationship between the presence of independent directors on firm 
boards and their risk-taking attitude (see Brick and Chidambaran, 2008; and Pathan, 2009). 
In contrast, Adams and Ferreira (2009) observe that women’s presence on firm boards might have 
a significant influence on board effectiveness, specifically on monitoring policy. This is because when 
a board is more gender-diverse, the attendance problems of male directors in meetings become much 
less severe. Empirical literature (see Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998) also shows that, in terms of risk 
preferences, men are more likely to take larger risks than their women counterparts. Accordingly, 
most studies (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; etc.) argue that in profitable firms, women on boards are 
tempted to exercise excessive monitoring following riskier decisions, which, in turn, might decrease 
shareholder value. There is a large body of empirical evidence on whether the presence of women on 
firm boards increases the propensity to take risks (see Faccio et al., 2016; etc.). Most of these studies 
report a decline in firm risk in women-dominated firms across countries, which also implies lower 
aspiration levels for these firms. In contrast, however, many empirical studies (see Hutchinson et al., 
2015; etc.)  document  the  positive  influence  of  women  directors  on  firm  performance  across  both 
 




countries and industries. Higher present performance would automatically drive higher firm aspiration 
levels for the future. However, once the aspiration level is reached, in women-led firms also, firm risk 
would be decreased. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
 
H1c: Strong boards (those with higher % of independent and women directors) have a negative 
impact on aspiration level of the firm. 
H5a & H5b: Strong boards (those with higher % of independent and women directors) have a 
negative impact on firm risk. 
 
BOARD EFFECTIVENESS AND FIRM RISK 
 
Following De Andres and Vallelado (2008) and Erkens et al. (2012), among others, the effectiveness of 
the board of directors in monitoring and advising managers determines its strength, and we use the 
term ‘effective board’ to indicate a board that represents a firm’s shareholders’ interests more 
strongly. In line with the assumptions of the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), we assume 
here that the number of directors serving a firm board is relevant to the outcome of the board’s 
decisions in relation to risk-taking. A negative relation between board size and firm performance is 
commonly found in literature (Yermack, 1996; and Hermalin and Weisbach, 2001) owing to the 
nimbleness, cohesiveness, lower communication and coordination costs, as well as fewer ‘free-riding’ 
director problems associated with smaller boards (Jensen, 1993; Chari et al., 2019). Yermack (1996) 
observes that small boards would be more likely to ratify riskier R&D-intensive investment projects 
that ultimately increase the overall firm risk and potentially lead to volatile performance. Therefore, a 
negative aspiration-performance gap due to lower performance cannot be ruled out for firms with 
small boards. Accordingly, this would create a forced higher aspiration level and intent to problemistic 
search, which implies that small board size does have a positive influence on firm risk. However, 
several studies observe that larger boards are necessary in large organisations to reflect the 
complexities of their business models (see Coles et al., 2008); to better monitor CEO functioning 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999); and to increase the pool of expertise and resources available (Van den 
Berghe and Levrau, 2004; see also impact of resource dependency theory (Pfeffer, 1972) on corporate 
governance (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007)). Coles et al. (2006) find that firm performance increases with 
board size for complex firms. Cheng (2008) also shows that US firms with larger boards exhibit higher 
performance and lower performance volatility. Jackling and Johl (2009) find that board size has a 
positive impact on performance among firms in India. Large board size negatively impacts firm risk-
taking due to the diversification of opinions effect (Sah and Stiglitz, 1986; 1991). Similarly, it would 
impact the aspiration level of the firm through improved performance. 
Frequency of board meetings is considered another important way to improve the effectiveness of 
the board (Adams and Ferriera, 2009) through effective monitoring and intensity of board activities 
(see resource dependency theory, Pfeffer, 1972). This takes into account the internal functioning of 
the board (De Andres and Vallelado, 2008) and how boards operate. Because meetings provide board 
members with the opportunity to come together and to discuss and exchange ideas on how they wish 
to monitor managers and firm strategy, we can argue that the more frequent the meetings are, the 
more likely it is that optimum control is exercised over managers. 
Ntim and Osei (2011) suggest that more frequent board meetings tend to lead to higher financial 
performance. Some evidence suggests that the association between the number of meetings and 
performance is more complex than previously reported. Vafeas (1999:140) shows that boards that 
meet more frequently are valued less by the market. However, this association disappears when prior 
 




stock performance is included in the model, suggesting that operating performance rises following 
years of abnormally high meeting frequency. Francis et al. (2012) find that firm stock performance is 
positively related to the number of board meetings. Thus, we can argue that high frequency of board 
meetings influences the aspiration level of the firm positively by improving the base operating 
performance. However, Johl (2006) finds a negative relationship between frequency of board 
meetings and entrepreneurial activities in firms. Jensen (1993) suggests that in such cases, boards 
would be relatively inactive, and evidence of higher board activity is likely to symbolize a response to 
poor performance i.e., problemistic search behaviours. Bhagat et al. (2015) emphasize the number of 
risk committee meetings as the driver of market performance, which implies strong risk governance 
or balanced risk-taking by firms. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
 
H1d: Effective boards (those with small board size and more board meetings) have a positive 
impact on aspiration level of the firm. 
H6a & H6b: Effective boards (those with small board size and more board meetings) have a 
positive impact on firm risk.  
 
FIRM ASPIRATION LEVEL AS A MEDIATOR 
 
One of the major reasons for incorporating aspiration level of the firm as a mediator in our model is to 
find how much of the impact of independent risk-antecedent constructs on firm risk is controlled by 
this behavioural driver. We measure a firm’s current aspiration level in relative terms to its preceding 
year’s own historical performance on a rolling basis. This is because risk-taking is a strategic behaviour, 
and the performance-aspiration gap guides this type of firm behaviour (see Cyert and March, 1963; 
Ansoff, 1979; and Fiegenbaum et al., 1996), which is why most early researchers use aspiration to 
explain risky choices of firms (Bromiley, 1991; Guney et al., 2018; Gao et al., 2019). However, the 
influence of firm fundamentals (see Venkatesh, 1989; Autio, 2005; Delmar and Wiklund, 2008; and Lu 
et al., 2019); firm performance (see Cyert and March, 1963; Ansoff, 1979; Bowman, 1980; 1984; 
Fiegenbaum et al., 1996; Greve, 1998; Massini et al., 2005; DasGupta and Deb, 2020; etc.); and 
corporate governance (through strong (see Fama and Jensen, 1983; Brick and Chidambaran, 2008; 
Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Pathan, 2009) and effective boards (see 
Yermack, 1996; De Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Cheng, 2008; Coles et al., 2008; Pathan, 2009; Erkens 
et al., 2012; and Bhagat et al., 2015)) on firm risk is well-documented. Therefore, although the 
importance of the role of aspiration level for firm’s strategic behaviour is conclusive, its significance as 
a mediator between risk-antecedent constructs and firm risk is not reported in the empirical literature, 
to the best of our knowledge. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 
H2a & H2b: Firm aspiration level has a positive impact on firm risk.  
H7a & H7b: Strong firm fundamentals have a negative impact on firm risk through a negative 
mediating effect of the aspiration level of the firm. 
H8a & H8b: Strong firm performance has a positive impact on firm risk through a positive 
mediating effect of the aspiration level of the firm. 
H9a & H9b: Strong boards (those with higher % of independent and women directors) have a 
negative impact on firm risk through a negative mediating effect of the aspiration level of the 
firm. 
H10a & H10b: Effective boards (those with small board size and more board meetings) have a 
positive impact on firm risk through a positive mediating effect of the aspiration level of the 
firm. 




FIRM EXPECTATION LEVEL AS A MEDIATOR 
 
Along with the aspiration level of the firm, the expected performance achievement (i.e., the 
expectation level, see Cyert and March, 1963; March and Shapira, 1987) is also of significance to 
managers in setting their performance targets and, therefore, firm risk. Beal and Crockett (2010) 
demonstrate that occupational expectations are influenced over time by participation in related 
additional activities (for example, for a manager in CSR), and that main activity participation (e.g., in 
regular business decisions such as those related to risk-taking) is in turn also influenced by 
expectations. For aspirational managers, possible selves (Markus and Nurius, 1986) serve as incentives 
for increasing goal-directed positive behaviour or for decreasing negative loss-making behaviour. 
Because possible selves are not necessarily derived from empirical realities, there is always the 
potential for some real disconnect between firm managers aspired-to selves (the possible selves they 
want to become) and their expected selves or the possible selves they believe they will become 
(expected-to selves). The possible reasons for such disconnect may be the fundamentals of the firms 
in which they operate; the internal operating performance; regulatory mechanisms such as corporate 
governance; and external environmental constraints such as national culture, investor protection rights, 
and the legal system (Markus and Nurius, 1986). 
Although all earlier studies use only actual performance to predict risk, we follow the behavioural 
theory (Cyert and March, 1963; and March and Shapira, 1987) of the firm and use expected 
performance in addition to actual performance. Cyert and March (1963: 97) and March and Shapira 
(1987) discuss expectations in the context of how managers interpret information and events. 
Typically, managers have expectations about events that occur outside the organization— in its 
environment—or about the consequences of a course of action. Therefore, although the important 
role of expectation level in determining firm’s strategic behaviour is conclusive, its significance as a 
mediator between risk-antecedent constructs and firm risk is not described in the empirical literature. 
Accordingly, we measure firm’s expectation level by future PE ratios, which represent both internal 
firm fundamentals and external market sentiment, in relative terms to its own PE from the preceding 
year on a rolling basis. Therefore, we present our hypotheses for firm’s expectation level as follows: 
 
H1a: Strong firm fundamentals have a negative impact on expectation level of the firm. 
H1b: Strong firm performance has a positive impact on expectation level of the firm. 
H1c: Strong boards (those with higher % of independent and women directors) have a negative 
impact on expectation level of the firm. 
H1d: Effective boards (those with small board size and more board meetings) have a positive 
impact on aspiration level of the firm. 
H2a & H2b: Firm expectation level has a positive impact on firm risk.  
H7a & H7b: Strong firm fundamentals have a negative impact on firm risk through a negative 
mediating effect of the expectation level of the firm. 
H8a & H8b: Strong firm performance has a positive impact on firm risk through a positive 
mediating effect of the expectation level of the firm. 
H9a & H9b: Strong boards (those with higher % of independent and women directors) have a 
negative impact on firm risk through a negative mediating effect of the expectation level of the 
firm. 
H10a & H10b: Effective boards (those with small board size and more board meetings) have a 
positive impact on firm risk through a positive mediating effect of the expectation level of the 
firm. 
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FIRM HETEROGENEITIES AND FIRM RISK 
 
Empirical studies (see Fisher and Hall, 1969; Coles et al., 2008; John et al., 2008; Li et al., 2013; etc.) 
show that firm’s heterogeneities and characteristics act as catalysts for the main conclusions drawn. 
Accordingly, we incorporate firm size, leverage, and liquidity to control for the impact of individual 
firms’ heterogeneities on its risk. We measure firm size by average total assets each study year (see 
Table 1 for details) which is indicative of ‘market power’, and, therefore, we assume that large-size 
firms are risk-averse (see Venkatesh, 1989). Pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) and Ferreira and 
Vilela’s (2004) free cash flow hypothesis prove this theoretically. However, this notion conflicts with 
the liquidity perspective, i.e., large firms hold less cash because of their greater access to capital 
markets due to their strong information symmetry and are, therefore, vulnerable to risk (see Opler et 
al., 1999; and Subramaniam et al., 2011). Therefore, overall, we argue that small firms are more risk-
seeking than their larger counterparts.  
Firms can also use borrowing as a substitute for holding cash (i.e., liquidity (proxied by cash and 
cash equivalents)) because leverage (proxied by total debt-to-total assets (see Table 1 for details)) 
could act as a proxy for the ability of firms to issue debt (John, 1993). This implies higher risk-taking by 
these firms. Baskin (1987) argues that the cost of funds used to invest in liquidity increases as the ratio 
of debt financing increases, which would imply a reduction in cash holdings with increased debt in 
capital structure. Thus, in both ways, we comprehend a risk-seeking attitude of these firms. Opler et 
al. (1999) predict that there is a negative relation between a firm’s cash holdings and its leverage in 
line with the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) and the free cash flow hypothesis (Ferreira and Vilela, 
2004). Firms with more resources (i.e., slack) tend to have more leeway to indulge in exploratory 
activities (Cyert and March, 1963) allowing their CEOs more discretion (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 
1987). Therefore, we argue that both excess liquidity and leverage increase firm risk. 
 
COUNTRY-LEVEL HETEROGENEITIES AND FIRM RISK 
 
The institutional, cultural, and economic environment of a country has been shown (see La Porta et 
al., 1998; 2008; Li et al., 2013; etc.) to affect a firm’s risk-taking decisions. Therefore, here, we classify 
our sample countries based on their economic status (developed vs. emerging) and also control for 
investor protection rights and national culture (see Table 1 for details) prevailing in individual countries. 
The impact of investor protection rights in a country on risk-taking by firms may be mixed in nature. 
It is proposed that when investor protection improves, there is less fear of expropriation by managers 
and, consequently, less need for concentrated ownership by dominant shareholders (Burkart et al., 
2003). This in turn might result in greater managerial discretion to implement safe and low-risk 
investment policies. However, it is also theorized that low investor protection rights might lead to low 
risk-taking. For example, non-equity stakeholders such as banks, governments, and organized labour, 
who often prefer conservative corporate investment, might influence investment policy for their own 
benefit. Their influence is reported to be higher in countries with low investor protection (Tirole, 2001). 
We rate the extent of investor’s protection in our sample countries in accordance with La Porta et al.’s 
arguments on company law in relation to minority shareholders’ rights across countries (1998; 2008). 
We assess such rights based on six important parameters5 related to voting rights (also referred to as  
 




anti-directors’ rights), wherein the existence of such parameters in the company laws of countries 
would earn a score of 1. Therefore, a total score of 6 would be assigned to countries offering best 
investors’ protection and vice-versa for score of 1 or 0. We define strong rights if the overall score is 
above 3 for our sample countries.  
The role of national culture in the firm risk context has also been documented recently in finance 
research (Li et al. 2013; Mihet, 2013). These studies report that culture can explain the institutional, 
legal, and economic environment of a country at the macro level, which may subsequently influence a 
firm’s risk-taking decisions (Graham et al., 2013; and Mihet, 2013). In line with the empirical literature 
(see Hofstede, 2001; Growiec and Growiec, 2011; Kanagaretnam et al., 2011; and Li et al., 2013), we use 
an uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) score and power distance index (PDI) score as part of the cultural 
country controls. We posit that firms in low-UAI countries would tend to take more risk in search of 
additional returns, without being overly concerned about downside risk, while firms in high-UAI 
countries would take fewer risks based on the opposite considerations (Kanagaretnam et al., 2011; and 
Li et al., 2013). We also suggest that firms in low-PDI countries would take on more risk because of the 
presence of a strong element of trust in the system (Growiec and Growiec, 2011). 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
DATA AND DESCRIPTIONS OF VARIABLES 
 
We collect data for the period of 2005–2017 from the Bloomberg database. Our final sample comprised 
1918 firms after excluding 214 financial companies from the initially collected 2142 firms. These 1918 
firms include 1103 companies from four developed countries; the remaining 815 firms are from four 
BRICS countries representing emerging countries. We exclude the fifth BRICS country, i.e., Russia, 
owing to data unavailability. Therefore, finally, we investigate 1918 firms comprising of 24,934 firm-
years for all 20 variables. This is in line with the requirements of the SEM for sample size, and comprises 
approximately 96 times as many cases as variables (see Byrne, 2010; and Gefen et al., 2011). 
Table 1 explains the variables (under different constructs) considered in this study. The 
unpredictability in a firm’s income stream is the result of its inherent risk (Bromiley, 1991; and Palmer 
and Wiseman, 1999). Therefore, here, we proxy firm risk by ROASD (see Gupta, 2017). CAPEX ratio also 
increases firm risk in two ways (see Shapiro and Titman, 1986): first, if a firm opts to be capital-intensive 
and demand fluctuates, there would be wider variations in income streams. Second, firm managers 
who use a large amount of capital for innovative searches run a high risk of capital obsolescence. Here, 
we calculate CAPEX ratio in line with Coles et al. (2006) (see Table 1 for details). 
















Table 1. Description of Variables 
This table explains the dependent and independent variables (under different constructs) used in this study. The firm-risk is 
proxied by return on assets standard deviation (ROASD) and capital expenditure (CAPEX) ratio. These two are the dependent 
variables here. The 15 independent variables (drivers/antecedents) as constructed here are classified into four broad heads 
(constructs) in accordance with their nature. The heads are shown in parentheses after each variable. 
Variables Description 
ROASD Ex-post standard deviation (σ) of individual firm’s actual return on assets (ROA) 
for preceding 5 years in year t 
CAPEX ratio [(Capital expenditure/Sales)*100] in year t 
Market size 
(FFD) Logn net sales amount in year t 
Growth opportunities 
(FFD) 
% change in investment in total assets in year t from year t-1 (i.e.,∆TAt = [{(TAt -
TAt-1)/TAt-1}*100]) 
Dividend payout 
(FFD) [(Equity dividend/PAT)*100] in year t 
P/BV 
(FFD) Market capitalisation in year t/Book value of assets in year t (scaled in average) 
Operating performance 
(FPD) Actual ROA [(PAT/Average total assets)*100] in year t 
Market performance 
(FPD) Annualised monthly market return {[((1 + R)^12) - 1] x 100} of a firm in year t 
Cash performance 
(FPD) 
[(OCF/Average total assets)*100] in year t [average total assets = (total assets in 
year t-1 + total assets in year t)/2] 
Board independence 
(CG-BCD) % of independent directors to total number of directors in the board in year t 
Women presence in board 
(CG-BCD) % of women directors in the firm board in year t 
Board size 
(CG-BED) Logn number of directors in the board in year t 
Board busyness 
(CG-BED) Logn number of board meetings in year t 
Aspiration 
(SMED) ASPt = ([ROAt-1 – ASPt-1 (i.e. ROAt-2)] + ROAt-1) 
Expectation 
(SMED) EXPt = ([PEt-1 – EXPt-1 (i.e., PEt-2)] + PEt-1) 
Leverage 
(Firm control) 
Debt/Average total assets in year t [average total assets = (total assets in year t-
1 + total assets in year t)/2] 
Liquidity 
(Firm control) 
Logn average [{opening balance + closing balance}/2] of cash balance and short-
term investments (i.e., cash and cash equivalents) in year t 
Size 
(Firm control) 
Logn average total assets in year t [average total assets = (total assets in year t-1 
+ total assets in year t)/2] 
Multi-group 
(Country control) 




Investor protection rights (calculated based on six parameters’ scores) 
information are collected from La Porta et al. (2008). 
National Culture 
(Country control) 
National culture score is the sum total of power distance and uncertainty 
avoidance scores as taken from Hofstede (2001) and La Porta et al. (2008). 
Note 1: All market return calculations are undertaken on adjusted closing price basis. 
Note 2: FFD – Firm fundamental drivers; FPD – Firm performance drivers; CG-BCD – Corporate governance-board composition 
drivers; and CG-BED – Corporate governance-board effectiveness drivers.  
Note 3: SMED – Strategic mediators. 
Note 4: PAT – Profit after tax; OCF – Operating cash flow; ASPt - Aspiration in year t; EXPt - Expectation in year t; PE - Price-
earnings ratio; TA – Total assets; and P/BV – Price-to-book value.




METHODS – EXPLORATORY AND CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS 
 
We employ the SEM here (see e.g., Byrne, 2010; and Gefen et al., 2011 for information on its benefits) 
to test the unidimensionality of the constructs and to analyze the risk antecedents of firm risk by 
validating our proposed models (see Fig. 1 & 2) (see Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). Factor analysis 
simultaneously tests the entire system of constructs that we have conceptualized in this study (see 
Fig. 1 & 2). We perform data analysis using SPSS version 20 and AMOS version 21. SEM comprising the 
CFA is utilized for validating the basic structure of the constructs in the proposed model, and path 
analysis is used for examining the proposed models. Therefore, we employ factor analyses (both 
exploratory and confirmatory), which are the most appropriate for testing a newfound theory and 
complex models with simultaneous linkages between investigated variables (as in this paper) (see 
Schreiber et al., 2006; and Gefen et al., 2011). 
It is also essential to purify the measuring instruments of variables that do not correlate to the 
constructs (Churchill, 1979) before we undertake any type of factor analysis. Therefore, we check the 
convergent validity of each construct by examining the average variance extracted (AVE) values. 
Constructs that have AVE values greater than 0.5 and composite reliability greater than 0.70 have a 
good convergent validity or unidimensionality (see Chin, 1998; and Chin et al., 2003). We ascertain the 
discriminant validity of constructs by comparing the AVE scores of the two constructs with the square 
of the correlation between the two constructs. If both the AVE values are larger than the square of 































Figure 1. Model 1 (Aspiration as a Mediator) 
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We also check the multivariate normality of all the variables used here by Shapiro-Wilks (S-W) test 
and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test, as well as by skewness and kurtosis. In accordance with the 
significance level of both tests, the data are found to be normally distributed. We use Mahalanobis D-
square and find that our dataset is free from outliers. Therefore, after testing the normality of the data 




We present here the evaluation, model fit, and analysis of the measurement model and the structural 
model (see Schreiber et al., 2006). 
 




Table 2 reports the mean, standard deviation, and correlation coefficients among the constructs that 
measure the conceptual and empirical distinctiveness between the studied variables. Mean and 
standard deviation of the constructs ranged from 5.99 to 11.94 and 2.44 to 4.75, respectively. The 
results of the correlation coefficients show that all the constructs used in this study are distinct, and, 
further, that high correlation is non-evident between these constructs. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics Results 
This table presents the descriptive statistics results i.e., mean, standard deviation (SD) and correlation 
coefficients in between our independent constructs and mediators. Here, FFD implies firm fundamental drivers; 
FPD stands for firm performance drivers; CG-BCD denotes corporate governance-board composition drivers; and 
CG-BED implies corporate governance-board effectiveness drivers. 





FFD 11.94 4.75 1      
Aspiration 8.99 3.92 -.202** 1     
Expectation 8.99 2.82 .431** .423** 1    
CG-BCD 5.99 2.75 -.220** .173** .134** 1   
CG-BED 5.99 2.44 -.179** -.244** -.275** .158** 1  
FPD 6.46 2.53 .031 .410** .455** .291** .073** 1 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS (CFA) 
 
Before testing the study hypotheses, we perform CFA by using AMOS 20 to examine the model fitness 
and assess the reliability and evaluate the convergent validity and discriminant validity of the scales 










ASSESSMENT OF MEASUREMENT MODEL FIT 
 
We test each construct’s measurement model with the maximum-likelihood estimation method, and 
find that the standardized factor loadings of all the items constituting various constructs are 
significant and greater than 0.70. We also determine several fit indices such as Goodness-of-fit index 
(GFI); adjusted GFI (AGFI); root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA); normal fit index (NFI); 
comparative fit index (CFI); parsimony goodness-of-fit index (PGFI); and parsimonious normed fit 
index (PNFI) to ensure the model fitness, as recommended by Hu et al. (1995) and Bagozzi et al. (1998). 
In our measurement model, results show that study constructs fulfil the recommended threshold and 
confirm the fitness of measurement model (Model 1: GFI=.891, AGFI=.820, RMSEA=.077, NFI=.996, 
CFI=.996; and Model 2: GFI=.889, AGFI=.830, RMSEA=.079, NFI=.996, CFI=.996). 
 
ASSESSMENT OF RELIABILITY 
 
Statistical scale reliability check of all constructs is essential to determine the internal structure of the 
hypothesized model. To ensure #meaningful statistical outcomes from the proposed model, we 
examine the statistical reliability of the scale based on the requisite criteria. Results shown in Table 3 
indicate that the measures satisfy the following requisite criteria: (a) factor loadings range from .748 
to .934 in all constructs (therefore, ≥0.7); (b) composite reliability of each construct is above the 
threshold i.e., CR≥0.6; and (c) Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of all the measures is above .801 (therefore, 
α ≥ 0.6) (see Fornell and Larcker, 1981; and Hair et al., 2017). 
 
Table 3. Reliability and Validity (Convergent Validity and Discriminant Validity) Analysis Results 
This table presents the reliability and validity (convergent validity and discriminant validity) results. Here, α 
implies Cronbach’s alpha, CR stands for composite reliability, AVE indicates average variance extracted, MSV 
denotes maximum shared variance and ASV stands for average shared variance. Also, FFD implies firm 
fundamental drivers; FPD stands for firm performance drivers; CG-BCD denotes corporate governance-board 
composition drivers; and CG-BED implies corporate governance-board effectiveness drivers. 
Constructs 
Factor 
Loading              




FFD .748- .875 .891 0.899 0.690 0.25 0.17 .830 
CG-BCD .915- .934 .919 0.922 0.670 0.085 0.075 .818 
CG-BED .828- .841 .821 0.821 0.560 0.171 0.165 .748 











ASSESSMENT OF CONVERGENT AND DISCRIMINANT VALIDITY 
 
Table 3 also shows the results for the convergent and discriminant validity of constructs. We use the 
convergent and discriminant validity to test the capability of constructs to measure the impact of risk 
antecedents on firm risk and mediating role of aspiration and expectation in such association (Zikmund 
et al., 2013). We establish the convergent validity of the constructs based on their AVE values, which 
range from 0.567 to 0.796— thereby exceeding the threshold value of 0.50 (Hair et al., 2017)—which 
implies sound convergent validity (Fornell and Larker, 1981; and Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). Further, 
the squared correlation of the constructs is greater than each construct’s AVE (Fornell and Larcker, 
1981); furthermore, the average shared variance (ASV) and maximum shared variance (MSV) values of 
each construct are lower than its AVE value, thereby implying each individual construct’s discriminant 
validity. 
 
STRUCTURAL MODEL EVALUATION 
 
After establishing the validation of the measurement model, we estimate the structural model by 
using path analysis, wherein SEM evaluates the research model and tests the hypothesized 
relationship between the constructs in the proposed model. 
 
ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURAL MODEL FIT 
 
MODEL 1 (FIRM ASPIRATION AS MEDIATOR) 
 
The structural path model 1 (see Fig.3) presents the hypothesized paths between the constructs (see 
Hu and Bentler, 1995). The fit indices generated in the hypothesized model (GFI=.993, AGFI=.940, 
NFI=.996, CFI=.996, and RMSEA=.071) met the threshold stated in the preceding sub-section, and 

























Figure 3. Structural Model with Path Estimates (Aspiration as a Mediator) 
Note: *p<0.10, **p<.05, ***p<.001 
 
HYPOTHESIZED PATH ASSESSMENT 
 
Tables 4 and 5 presents the results of the SEM analysis performed on Model 1 (see Fig. 1) to examine 



























Table 4. Hypotheses Testing (Model 1 (see Fig. 1)) Results 
This table depicts the results of Model 1 (Aspiration as mediator). The measurement model results indicate how 
the latent variables are related to the observed variables. The estimates show the standardized coefficients in 
structural equation modelling, and also reveal the findings of proposed hypotheses. Here, FFD implies firm 
fundamental drivers; FPD stands for firm performance drivers; CG-BCD denotes corporate governance-board 
composition drivers; and CG-BED implies corporate governance-board effectiveness drivers. 
Hypothesis Relationship Estimates p Remarks 
H1a FFD-Aspiration -.131 <.001 Supported 
H1b FPD-Aspiration .389 <.001 Supported 
H1c CG-BCD-Aspiration .093 <.001 Contradict 
H1d CG-BED-Aspiration .219 <.001 Supported 
H2a Aspiration-Firm-risk (ROASD) .050 <.06 Supported 
H2b Aspiration- Firm-risk (CAPEX ratio) .031 <.219 Not Supported 
H3a FFD- Firm-risk (ROASD) -.082 <.001 Supported 
H3b FFD- Firm-risk (CAPEX ratio) -.540 <.082 Supported 
H4a FPD- Firm-risk (ROASD) .038 <.121 Not supported 
H4b FPD- Firm-risk (CAPEX ratio) .000 <.001 No effect 
H5a CG-BCD- Firm-risk (ROASD) -.012 <.637 Not supported 
H5b CG-BCD- Firm-risk (CAPEX ratio) -.178 <.001 Supported 
H6a CG-BED- Firm-risk (ROASD) .049 <.064 Supported 
H6b CG-BED- Firm-risk (CAPEX ratio) -.090 <.001 Contradict 
 
Table 5. Results After Introduction of Mediating Variable (i.e., Firm Aspiration) 
These findings explain the relationship between the dependent variables and independent variables after 
introducing the Aspiration as a mediator variable. In mediation model, both direct and indirect effects are shown 
on dependent variables. The indirect effect also reveals the magnitude of indirect effect in the model. Here, FFD 
implies firm fundamental drivers; FPD stands for firm performance drivers; CG-BCD denotes corporate 






Mediator Indirect Effect 
H7a FFD-Aspiration-ROASD -.082(.001) -.083 (.001) Significant, Partial mediation 
H7b FFD-Aspiration-CAPEX ratio -.540 (.08) -.559 (.078) Not Significant, No mediation 
H8a FPD- Aspiration -ROASD .038 (.121) .019 (.491) Not Significant, No mediation 
H8b FPD-Aspiration-CAPEX ratio - - No effect 
H9a CG(BCD)-Aspiration-ROASD -.012 (.637) -.018 (.491) Significant, Full mediation 
H9b CG(BCD)-Aspiration-CAPEX ratio -.178 (.000) -.183 (.000) 
Not significant, no 
mediation 
H10a CG(BED)-Aspiration- ROASD .049 (.064) .038 (.153) Significant, Full mediation 
H10b CG(BED)-Aspiration- CAPEX ratio -.090 (.000) -.102 (.000) 
Not significant, no 
mediation 
 




In the first cluster of hypotheses (H1a, H1b, H1c, and H1d), our results establish a significant 
relationship between firm fundamentals and aspiration (β=-.131, p<.001), firm performance with 
aspiration (β= .389, p<.001), firm corporate governance- board composition drivers (CG-BCD) with 
aspiration (β= .093, p<.001), and firm corporate governance- board effectiveness drivers (CG-BED) with 
aspiration (β= .219, p<.001), as we report in Table 4. Hence, our findings support hypotheses H1a, H1b, 
and H1d but reject H1c. The next cluster of hypotheses (H2a, H2b, H3a, H3b, H4a, H4b, H5a, H5b, H6a, 
and H6b) is concerned with the association of various risk antecedents (FFD, FPD, CG-BCD, and CG-
BED [see table 1 for descriptions]) with firm risk (i.e., ROASD and CAPEX ratio). H2a and H2b are 
concerned with the association of aspiration with ROASD (β= .050, p<.064) and CAPEX ratio (β=.031, 
p<.219). Although H2a is supported at the 10% significance level, results for H2b are not found to be 
statistically significant to support our hypotheses. Hypotheses H3a and H3b focus on the relationship 
between firm fundamentals and ROASD (β=-.082, p<.001) and CAPEX ratio (β=-.540, p<.082), 
respectively; analytical results demonstrate a negative and significant effect on both ROASD and 
CAPEX, therefore supporting the hypotheses. Hypotheses H4a and H4b consider the association of 
performance with ROASD (β=.038, p<.121) and CAPEX ratio (β=.000); results show that H4a is not 
significantly supported and H4b does not show any effect of firm performance on CAPEX. Therefore, 
H4a and H4b are both rejected. In hypotheses H5a and H5b, we postulate that CG-BCD relates to the 
ROASD and CAPEX. We find no statistical significance for H5a (β=-.012, p<.637), therefore, it is not 
supported. However, we find that the results in support of H5b to be statistically significant (β=-.178, 
p<.001); therefore, this hypothesis is fully supported. In hypotheses H6a and H6b, we propose that CG-
BED relates to the ROASD and CAPEX. As shown in Table 4, CG-BED has a strong and significant 
association with ROASD (β=.049, p<.06) and CAPEX ratio (β=-.090, p<.001), thereby supporting H6a 
and H6b.  
Table 5 shows the results when a firm’s aspiration level is considered as the mediator. As suggested 
by Baron and Kenny (1986), it involves the mediation analysis approach that explains the process that 
underlies an observed relationship between independent and dependent variables while including the 
mediator variable. The inclusion of the mediator variable would either lower (partial mediation) or lend 
insignificance (full mediation) to the prior direct association of independent and dependent variables.  
Hypotheses H7a, H7b, H8a, H8b, H9a, H9b, H10a, and H10b relate to the impact of firm 
fundamentals, firm performance, CG-BCD, and CG-BED on firm risk (i.e., ROASD and CAPEX ratio), 
when aspiration is considered as mediator. In line with the Baron and Kenny’s (1986) recommendation, 
we find significant results for H7a, H9a, and H10a, therefore supporting the mediation effects of 
aspiration in the proposed Model 1. After introducing aspiration as a mediator, we observe an increase 
in the value of the path estimate corresponding to the impact of firm fundamentals, CG-BCD, and CG-
BED on ROASD, and partial and full mediation is found, which supports the mediation effect of 
aspiration. In this analysis, we also perform a bootstrapping to test the indirect effect between 
variables. 
When introducing aspiration as the mediator variable, we also examine the effect of firm-level 
heterogeneities and country-level heterogeneities as control variables on the model. Our results 
report that country control-variables (IPR and national culture) do not have a significant effect on the 
model, while firm control- variables (leverage, liquidity, and firm size) significantly affect firm risk. Our 
findings specifically show that liquidity positively and significantly affects the aspiration level (β = .127, 
p <.010), while leverage has a significant negative impact on the aspiration (β = -.184, p <.000). Probing 
the impact of these firm-control variables on firm risk (ROASD and CAPEX), we find that liquidity (β = 
.291, p <.002) and firm size (β = .506, p <.04) positively affect the ROASD. Findings also suggest that 
leverage (β = .20, p <.000) and size (β = .506, p <.02) positively affect the CAPEX ratio, whereas liquidity 
has a negative and significant effect on it (β = -.214, p <.024). 




MODEL 2 (FIRM EXPECTATION AS MEDIATOR) AND HYPOTHESIZED PATH ASSESSMENT 
 
We perform the same analysis by introducing firm expectation as a mediator to define the relationship 
between firm risk and its antecedents. Figure 4 shows the path estimates of the hypothesized model. 
Further, Table 6 shows the results of hypotheses cluster (from H1a to H1d, H2a-H2b, and H3a-H6b), 
where we examine the relationship between endogenous and exogenous variables without 
incorporating the mediation effect of expectation on firm risk. These results show that all the 
hypotheses are supported in accordance with the proposed model, except for H2a, H3b, H4a and H5a, 
and, specifically, the results contradict H6b. Our results show that expectation (β = -.011, p <.68) and 
firm performance (β = .043, p <.11), and CG-BCD (β = -.010, p <.68) do not have a direct effect on the 




Figure 4. Structural Model with Path Estimates (expectation as a mediator) 



























Table 6. Hypotheses Testing (Model 2 (see Fig. 2)) Results 
This table depicts the results of Model 2 (Expectation as a mediator), the measurement model results indicate 
how the latent variables are related to the observed variables. The estimates show the standardized coefficients 
in structural equation modelling, and also reveal the findings of proposed hypotheses. Here, FFD implies firm 
fundamental drivers; FPD stands for firm performance drivers; CG-BCD denotes corporate governance-board 
composition drivers; and CG-BED implies corporate governance-board effectiveness drivers. 
Hypothesis Relationship Estimates p Remarks 
H1a FFD-Expectation -.186 <.001 Supported 
H1b FPD-Expectation .370 <.001 Supported 
H1c CG-BCD-Expectation .126 <.001 Contradict 
H1d CG-BED-Expectation .220 <.001 Supported 
H2a Expectation-Firm-risk (ROASD) -.011 <.68 Not Supported 
H2b Expectation-Firm-risk (CAPEX ratio) .049 <.05 Supported 
H3 FFD- Firm-risk (ROASD) -.075 <.001 Supported 
H3b FFD- Firm-risk (CAPEX ratio) -.553 <.081 Supported 
H4a FPD- Firm-risk (ROASD) .043 <.113 Not supported 
H4b FPD- Firm-risk (CAPEX ratio) .000 <.001 No effect 
H5a CG-BCD- Firm-risk (ROASD) -.010 <.685 Not supported 
H5b CG-BCD- Firm-risk (CAPEX ratio) -.187 <.001 Supported 
H6a CG-BED- Firm-risk (ROASD) .051 <.05 Supported 
H6b CG-BED- Firm-risk (CAPEX ratio) -.109 <.001 Contradict 
 
Table 7 presents the results after introducing firm expectation as the mediator. Hypotheses H7a, 
H7b, H8a, H8b, H9a, H9b, H10a, and H10b concern the impact of firm fundamentals, firm performance, 
CG-BCD, and CG-BED on firm risk (i.e., ROASD and CAPEX ratio) when expectation is considered as 
mediator. Based on our results, we find results for H7b and H9b to be significant, supporting the 
mediating effects of expectation in the proposed Model 2. After introducing expectation as the 
mediator, we observe an increase in the value of the path estimate corresponding to the impact of 
firm fundamentals and board composition on CAPEX ratio, and also find partial and full mediation that 





















Table 7. Results After Introduction of Mediating Variable (i.e., Firm Expectation) 
These findings explain the relationship between the dependent variables and independent variables after 
introducing expectation as a mediator variable. In mediation model, both direct and indirect effects are shown 
on dependent variables. The indirect effect also reveals the magnitude of indirect effect in the model. Here, FFD 
implies firm fundamental drivers; FPD stands for firm performance drivers; CG-BCD denotes corporate 





with Mediator Indirect Effect 
H7a FFD-Expectation-ROASD -.079 (.001) -.078 (.001) Not Significant, No mediation 
H7b FFD-Expectation-CAPEX ratio -.540 (.08) -.553 (.08) Significant, Full mediation 
H8a FPD-Expectation-ROASD .038 (.121) .043 (.116) Not Significant, No mediation 
H8b FPD-Expectation-CAPEX ratio - - No effect 
H9a CG-BCD-Expectation-ROASD -.012 (.637) -.010 (.665) Not Significant, Full mediation 
H9b CG-BCD-Expectation-CAPEX ratio -.178 (.000) -.187 (.001) 
Significant, partial 
mediation 
H10a CG-BED-Expectation-ROASD .049 (.064) .051 (.05) Not Significant, No mediation 




In this model, we also consider firm control-variables (leverage, liquidity, and firm size) and country 
control-variables (IPR and National culture) as proxies for firm- and country-level heterogeneities. Our 
results report that country control variables have no significant impact on the model constructs; 
however, firm control-variables significantly affect these constructs. For instance, leverage has a 
significant negative effect on firm expectation (β = -.018, p <.000). Further, liquidity has a significant 
positive effect on the firm risk (ROASD) (β = .293, p <.002) and significant negative effect on CAPEX 
ratio (β = -.214, p <.02). On the contrary, firm size has a positive effect on the firm risk (ROASD: β = .507, 
p <.04; CAPEX: β = .560, p <.023). Leverage also has a significant positive impact on the firm risk 
(CAPEX) (β = .201, p <.000) and does not impact ROASD. 
 
ROBUSTNESS TESTS RESULTS 
 
To check robustness, we undertake two additional tests. Under the first robustness test, we test the 
proposed model while considering ROE as an aspiration mediator. This is an out-of-the sample test. 
This analysis is performed to investigate the effect of ROE-aspiration as a mediator between risk 
antecedents and firm’s risk-taking. The fit indices for this robustness model (GFI=.993, AGFI=.940, 
NFI=.996, CFI=.996, CMIN/DF = 12.862, and RMSEA=.079) met the threshold supporting the model 
fitness, thereby allowing testing of the hypothesized relationship between the constructs. 
In Table 8 (see also Fig. 5 for the model), we check the relationship between ROE-based aspiration 
mediator and our main dependent and independent variables. Results show that this aspiration 
mediator establishes a statistically significant relationship with CG-BCD (β= .128, p<.001) and ROASD 
(β= .058, p<.01). However, it does not have a significant relationship with other variables. Table 9 
shows  the  direct  effects  of  studied  variables  on  firm  risk  (ROASD and CAPEX ratio), and  our  direct 




results after inclusion of ROE-based aspiration as a mediator. Our results show that fundamental 
variables negatively affect the ROASD (β= -.093, p<.001) and CAPEX ratio (β= -.543, p<.08) in the 
presence of the ROE-based aspiration mediator. Similarly, CG-BCD (β= -.175, p<.001) and CG-BED (β= -
.090, p<.002) have a negative and statistically significant effect on CAPEX ratio. In contrast, board 
effectiveness has a positive and statistically significant effect on ROASD (β= .049, p<.05). 
The robustness tests analyse the hypothesized model using out-of-the-sample data. In summary, 
the results show that firm variables (fundamental, performance, CG (board composition) and CG 
(board effectiveness)) influence the firm risk behaviour (ROASD and CAPEX ratio) in the presence of 
ROE-based aspiration-mediation also. 
 
Table 8. Results After Introduction of Mediating Variable (i.e., ROE-based Firm Aspiration) (Robustness 
Test 1) 
These findings explain the relationship between the dependent variables and independent variables after 
introducing the Aspiration (ROE-based) as a mediator variable. Here, ROE stands for return on equity which is an 
out-of-the sample variable. In mediation model, both direct and indirect effects are shown on dependent 
variables. The indirect effect also reveals the magnitude of indirect effect in the model. Here, FFD implies firm 
fundamental drivers; FPD stands for firm performance drivers; CG-BCD denotes corporate governance-board 
composition drivers; and CG-BED implies corporate governance-board effectiveness drivers. 
Hypothesis Relationship Estimates p Remarks 
H1a FFD-Aspiration -.002  <.975 Not Supported 
H1b FPD-Aspiration .035  <.175 Not Supported 
H1c CG-BCD-Aspiration .128  <.000 Supported 
H1d CG-BED-Aspiration -.018  <.513 Not Supported 
H2a Aspiration-Firm-risk (ROASD) .058 <.017 Supported 



























Table 9. Results After Introduction of Mediating Variable (i.e., ROE-based Firm Aspiration) (Robustness 
Test 1) 
These findings explain the relationship between the dependent variables and independent variables after 
introducing the Aspiration (ROE-based) as a mediator variable. Here, ROE stands for return on equity which is an 
out-of-the sample variable. In mediation model, both direct and indirect effects are shown on dependent 
variables. The indirect effect also reveals the magnitude of indirect effect in the model. Here, FFD implies firm 
fundamental drivers; FPD stands for firm performance drivers; CG-BCD denotes corporate governance-board 





with Mediator Indirect Effect 
H7a FFD-Aspiration-ROASD -.901 (.001) -.903 (.001) Not Significant, No mediation 
H7b FFD-Aspiration-CAPEX ratio -.543 (.087) -.543 (.083) Not Significant, No mediation 
H8a FPD- Aspiration -ROASD .036 (.142) .036 (.155) Not Significant, No mediation 
H8b FPD-Aspiration-CAPEX ratio - - No effect 
H9a CG(BCD)-Aspiration-ROASD -.019 (.458) -.019 (.431) Not Significant, No mediation 
H9b CG(BCD)-Aspiration-CAPEX ratio -.175 (.000) -.175 (.001) Not Significant, No mediation 
H10a CG(BED)-Aspiration- ROASD .049 (.064) .050 (.051) Significant, partial mediation 
H10b CG(BED)-Aspiration- CAPEX ratio -.090 (.000) -.090 (.002) Not Significant, No mediation 
 
 
Figure 5. Structural Model with Path Estimates (aspiration [ROE-based] as a mediator) 
Note: *p<0.10, **p<.05, ***p<.001
                                                                                                                                                                          




Second, we also run the same models dividing the sample into developed and emerging economies. 
We assume that developed economic status might result in a more balanced and prudent approach by 
the firms and managers of these economies, which brings about transparency and stability in regard 
to firms’ risk-taking behaviour. The results of the multi-group analysis reveal that some fitness indices 
are significant (CFI=.995, NFI=.994, and RMSEA=.062) for developed countries; however, such results 
do not provide substantial support for the differential impact of overall country-specific economic 
status on firm risk. Rather, for both emerging and developed countries, the results are in line with our 
overall results without much deviation.  
These results clearly document the indispensability of firm aspiration and expectation as possible 
mediators between firm risk and its antecedents in a cross-country and cross-cultural set-up, 
irrespective of the country’s economic development status.  
 
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
Our results show that firm fundamentals discourage high expectation and aspiration among firm 
managers, and therefore encourage them to act in a risk-averse fashion. This might be due to the fact 
that owing to high past performance, firms carry sufficient slack resources that are used for 
subsequent regular and expansionary business requirements. This finding is consistent with the 
strategic management literature (see Cyert and March, 1963; Ansoff, 1979; Fiegenbaum et al., 1996), 
but contradicts the empirical results of Chen and Miller (2007); Iyer and Miller (2008) and Labianca et 
al. (2009). We also document that although firm performance (historical) has a significant positive 
impact on firm aspiration and expectation, it does not drive firm risk. These results imply that the 
behavioural theory (Cyert and March, 1963) holds true. However, the findings of Bowman (1980; 1984) 
that firm performance plays a catalyst role, especially in case of troubled firms, were not replicated in 
our cross-country sample firms. 
Our results for the first driver of corporate governance – board composition – contradict the 
fundamental hypothesis (as developed in line with Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Kumar and 
Sivaramakrishnan, 2008; Pathan, 2009; Faccio et al., 2016; etc.) that strong boards would have a 
negative impact on firm aspiration and expectation. Rather, to the best of our knowledge, we show 
here—for the first time—that a board comprising of higher percentage of independent and women 
directors would positively impact firm aspiration and expectation. However, this striving aspiration is 
not converted into high firm risk given that our results report that both firm aspiration and expectation 
have a strong negative impact on it. These results are in line with earlier findings for single-country 
developed markets from scholars such as Brick and Chidambaran (2008); and Pathan (2009). We also 
report that effective boards positively impact firm aspiration and expectation as well as firm risk. 
However, our CAPEX ratio variable results contradict (in line with earlier results for discretionary risk-
taking of Yermack,1996; Cheng, 2008; Ntim and Osei, 2011; Gao et al., 2019; etc. and document a 
significant negative impact of board size (small) and board meetings (more) on firm risk. Therefore, 
we might argue that effective boards are risk-averse in managerial risk-taking (discretionary); 
however; because of strong operational performance, income stream uncertainty/volatility is present 
in such cases. 
We also report significant positive impact of both firm aspiration and expectation on firm risk, in 
line with our hypotheses. 
Our results show that all studied risk antecedents, except CG-BCD, influence both aspiration and 
expectation levels of the firm in line with the hypotheses drawn. However, board composition or 
diversity  positively  impacts  them.  Therefore,  these  findings  also  contradict  the  standard  corporate 
 




governance arguments of ‘monitoring’ (Fama, 1980) and ‘reputation’ (Pathan, 2009). We strongly 
argue that because of the presence of a higher percentage of independent directors and women 
directors on the board, firms have higher aspiration through an increasing yet stable performance on 
a rolling basis. Both aspiration and expectation levels of the firm also have a positive influence on firm 
risk. However, when we use aspiration and expectation (separately) as a mediator variable, we find a 
strong negative influence of board composition on firm risk. This is also in line with our direct and 
insignificant results for the effect of CG-BCD on firm risk. Therefore, we may conclude that when we 
apply the mediating effect of firm aspiration and expectation on CG-BCD to firm risk, the negative 
channel is strongly evident. 
We also find that both aspiration and expectation levels of the firm mediate the impact of firm 
fundamentals on firm risk. 
Our results illustrate that corporate governance-board effectiveness significantly positively 
influences firm aspiration level. It also impacts firm risk positively only in case of income stream 
variability. However, it has a negative impact on firm’s discretionary risk-taking in regard to CAPEX as 
evidenced by the negative coefficient, which contradicts our hypothesis. This might be because firms 
with high variability in income opt out from shouldering additional burden of risk in regard to capital 
spending for expansion or development. When we introduce firm aspiration level as the mediator, it 
further augments CG-BED’s influence on firm risk. However, expectation level has no role to play in 
mediating this association.  
Most of our findings are further substantiated by the results of our robustness tests, specifically 
the out-of-the-sample ROE-based aspiration mediator. 
Our study results would be of immense value to firm managers, investors, policymakers, and other 
stakeholders by enabling them to assess the significance of firm aspiration and expectation in 
mediating the effects of risk antecedents on firm risk in the overall risk-return context. Furthermore, 
our findings are generalizable across emerging- and developed-country perspectives with different 
firm- and country-level heterogeneities. Firm managers may obtain useful insights from our study 
findings, which show how their aspiration acts as a catalyst in utilising firm’s institutionalized facets to 
drive risk-taking activities. It is also beneficial for them to have a strict regulatory mechanism that 
would positively influence them to avoid value-reducing risk-taking (Chari et al., 2019), and, therefore, 
maintain their reputation in job markets (Pathan, 2009). Our results would also help firm stakeholders 
make strategic policy decisions and portfolio rebalancing decisions in an objective and timely fashion. 
However, our study is not free from limitations. In future work, researchers can examine the role of 
external factors such as economic, political, regulatory, and institutional, conditions in driving firm risk 
along with the antecedents studied here. Also, variations and trends in firm aspiration could be 
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